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INTRODUCTION: ADOLESCENT
MEDICAL DECISION MAKING AND
THE LAW OF THE HORSE
AMANDA C. PUSTILNIK*
LESLIE MELTZER HENRY**

Legal and ethical regimes relating to adolescent medical decision making
resemble what Judge Frank H. Easterbrook derisively called "the Law of the
Horse": Many laws deal with horses, he wrote, but there is no such field as "horse
law."' Similarly, even though the United States has juvenile and family courts, as
well as pediatric and adolescent medical departments, there is not a distinct field of
"adolescent medical decision-making law" or ethics; there are just many disparate
policies that implicate or impinge upon decisions made by adolescents. These
include state laws ranging from those that permit minors to seek treatment for
substance misuse or mental illness without parental consent to those that prohibit
tattoo parlors from serving minors even with parental consent. They also include
ethical norms that inform hospital and clinic policies about whether minors may
refuse life-extending medical treatment over their parents' objections or whether
parents may compel their children to have cosmetic procedures without the child's
agreement. At first glance, this range of policies might seem less coherent and
productive to mine as a unified body of legal and ethical norms than even "horse
law."
But there is a deeper connection between adolescent decision-making law and
ethics and "the Law of the Horse," one that suggests that adolescent decision
making may not be the disparate collection of regimes that it appears to be. In
challenging Judge Easterbook's characterization of the then-nascent field of
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1. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 20708. For the provenance of the expression, which originated with Karl Llewellyn, see Lawrence Lessig,
The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARv. L. REV. 501, 501 n.l (1999).
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Internet law as being merely the "Law of the Horse," Professor Lawrence Lessig
asserted that cyberlaw illuminated a general set of issues about the law's ability to
function as a regulator in physical and non-physical space. 2 The lessons of
cyberlaw, he argued, could inform scholarship in many areas concerned with the
law's capacities and limits. 3
We make a similar claim about laws and ethical norms relating to adolescent
decision making, although it is not nearly as broad. The seemingly disparate
policies relating to adolescent decision making illuminate more general issues
about how legal and ethical doctrines incorporate scientific information about
human cognition and development. Since the existence of separate laws and ethical
norms for adolescents and adults is premised on actual differences between them,
some kind of consensus about the nature of those differences ought to unify the
"law and ethics of adolescent medical decision making." But it does not. To
paraphrase Lessig slightly (and, no doubt, with apologies due), by working through
examples of how legal and ethical doctrines interact with issues of adolescent
decision making, we can elucidate a set of general questions about doctrinal
reliance, or lack thereof, on neuroscientific evidence about human development and
behavior. 4
In the service of this goal, this symposium issue of the Journal of Health Care
Law & Policy presents a collection of essays that coalesce around the regulation of
adolescent decision making in light of current research on brain development. On
April 15, 2011, the Law & Health Care Program at the University of Maryland
Francis King Carey School of Law and the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of
Bioethics co-sponsored a conference to address these issues.5 The Roundtable
Conference on Adolescent Decision-Making brought together leading academics
and practitioners to discuss legal and ethical norms relating to adolescent decision
making in light of recent developments in neuroscience.
The pieces collected in this issue span a range of approaches to considering
adolescents' capacities and rights to make independent decisions, as balanced
against the rights and interests of other stakeholders, such as parents and medical
professionals. This Introduction will first present a brief overview of the range of
legal and ethical issues relating to adolescent decision making that the Roundtable
participants considered. In light of these varied considerations, this Introduction
will then consider adolescent consent and assent; that is, the distinction between

2. Lessig, supra note 1, at 502.
3. Id.
4. Lessig's original sentence reads, "By working through these examples of law interacting with
cyberspace, we will throw into relief a set of general questions about law's regulation outside of
cyberspace." Id.
5. Conferences & Symposia: Roundiable on Adolescent Decision-Making, UNIV. OF MD FRANCIS
KING CAREY SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.umaryland.edu/faculty/conferences/detail.htnl?conf=108
(last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
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adolescents' ability to be the primary or exclusive decision-maker versus their
rights and abilities to accede to decisions suggested by others on their behalf. It
concludes by describing each author's contribution to this issue. We hope you will
learn as much from the Roundtable participants' papers as we did.
I. HETEROGENEITY AND CONSISTENCY IN ADOLESCENT MEDICAL DECISIONMAKING DOCTRINES

A. Legal Heterogeneity
As Professor Jessie Hill explains in her article, the legal standards governing
adolescents' autonomy over their bodies are "famously indeterminate" and can lead
to apparently bizarre contradictions. 6 In some jurisdictions, an adolescent can admit
herself to a psychiatric hospital, but she cannot receive an aspirin from the school
nurse without parental permission. She can procure an abortion without her
parents' knowledge or consent, but she cannot get a tattoo even with their
permission. Her parents may force her into drug treatment against her will, yet she
may refuse life-extending treatment for a terminal illness over her parents'
objections. And this same adolescent, who cannot get an aspirin without parental
consent, could be sentenced by the state to hard time in an adult prison if she were
to commit a crime of violence.
Contradictions and disparities within and across jurisdictions are not unique
to laws relating to adolescent decision making, nor are they necessarily
problematic. Because the life of the law has been history and not logic (as Justice
Holmes nearly said),7 disparate intra-jurisdictional regimes often result from path
dependency and historical contingency. And because states innovate to develop
locally appropriate legal regimes, inter-jurisdictional differences are part of the
fabric of federalism.
Another major driver of heterogeneity among these legal regimes is that the
interests of parent, state, child, and the general public appropriately have different
weight across different kinds of legal problems. For example, public safety
considerations might weigh in favor of allowing a distraught and dangerous teen to
independently commit himself to a psychiatric hospital despite the concerns the law
otherwise has about the right of his parents to direct his medical care. Conversely,
considerations of institutional liability and respect for parental authority, as well as

6. B. Jessie Hill, Medical Decision Making by and on Behalf ofAdolescents: Reconsidering First
Principles, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 35, 35 (2012). See also Richard C. Boldt, Adolescent
Decision Making: Legal Issues With Respect to Treatment for Substance Misuse and Mental Illness, 15
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 71, 86-95 (2012) (providing an overview of diverse state laws which either
grant or withold from adolescents the decision-making authority to seek treatment for substance misuse
or mental illness).
7. See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW I (1881) ("The life of the law has not been logic; it
has been experience.").
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the absence of present danger to the public, might justify a state law that requires a
school to have parental permission on file before giving the same boy an aspirin.
Thus, these apparent contradictions may-at least in some instances-flow quite
logically from balancing a variety of stakeholders' interests in these diverse
contexts.
Heterogeneity in legal regimes relating to adolescent decision making is to be
welcomed if it results from popular and judicial weighing of competing
considerations within the particular area of law. Two jurisdictions might weigh
public safety versus autonomy differently or set different thresholds for the state's
interference with parents' authority. Dissimilar weightings are not necessarily
inconsistent; they just reflect diverse normative preferences or developmental
pathways in that jurisdiction's laws. Moreover, one branch of law relative to
another will routinely and appropriately treat an issue involving the same persons
and facts in different ways.
B. EthicalAmbiguities
The heterogeneity in legal standards for adolescent decision making is
reflected in, and perhaps reinforced by, genuine ethical disagreement as to when,
whether, and how medical professionals ought to include adolescents in decisions
about their own care. In the last century, the legal and ethical doctrine of informed
consent-which obligates health care providers to provide patients with the
information necessary to make knowledgeable, voluntary, and rational decisions
about their care'-has transformed the doctor-patient relationship from a
paternalistic one, in which "doctors know best" about their patients' healthcare,9 to
a more collaborative one, in which patients and doctors work together to make
treatment decisions.' 0 While this framework invites adult patients to participate in
their health care, it generally entitles adolescents to do the same only in three
circumstances: emancipated minors, mature minors, and minors seeking treatment
for certain medical conditions, such as sexually transmitted diseases, alcohol or
drug misuse, and pregnancy." Otherwise, minors are generally thought to lack the
requisite decision-making capacity to consent to health care.12
In recent years, however, the ethical doctrine of assent has gained traction as
a mechanism to invite children of various ages, but particularly adolescents, to

8. PAUL APPLEBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE

(1987).
9. JAMES F. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE? PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE (1982).
10. James F. Childress & Mark Siegler, Metaphors and Models of Doctor-PatientRelationships:
Their Implicationsfor Autonomy, 5 THEORETICAL MED. 17, 18-21 (1984) (describing models of health
care decision making).
I1. See Comm. on Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric
Practice,95 PEDIATRICS 314, 316 (1995).
12. Id.
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voice their treatment preferences. The American Medical Association views
adolescents as increasingly capable of independent relationships with their health
care providers,' 3 and the American Academy of Pediatrics suggests that "as
children develop, they should gradually become . .. the primary partners in medical
decision-making, assuming responsibility from their parents."l 4 Both organizations
endorse adolescent assent, but there is little agreement among health care providers,
bioethicists, and others as to what assent requires, the age at which children can
"assent," the amount and kind of information health care providers ought to
disclose to children, and how to assess children's understanding of that
information.' 5 Consequently, some commentators contend that "assent is in the
midst of an identity crisis." 6
Nowhere is this crisis more problematic than when adolescents refuse to
assent to a particular procedure endorsed by their parents. Should physicians
proceed over an adolescent's dissent when the patient refuses surgical repair of a
malformed ear, an orthopedic device to manage scoliosis, or psychotropic
medication to manage attention deficit disorder? These treatment refusals, though
not without physical and psychological harm, are not fatal. But how should the
assent doctrine, in the absence of relevant laws, respond to the adolescent with
cancer who refuses further rounds of chemotherapy? Does the patient's age matter
in this context? What about other indicia of maturity and decisional capacity, such
as the patient's previous health care experience? As the assent doctrine develops,
these questions about the moral authority of adolescents' decisions will require
continued and thoughtful attention.
C. Adolescent Difference as the ConsistentFoundation
Despite the heterogeneity of laws governing adolescent decision making and
the absence of a clear paradigm for adolescent assent, policies on adolescent
decision making should, indeed must, share fundamental similarities. Although
there are many good reasons to support heterogeneity within and across regimes on
any particular topic, to argue that special policies ought to exist for adolescents is to
grant that adolescents and adults are different. Without acknowledging that
adolescents are distinct from adults, separate regimes for adolescents and adults
would lack justification. Further, even if the legal relevance and treatment of the
bio-social differences between adults and adolescents varies within and across

13. See AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS Op. 5.055CONFIDENTIAL CARE FOR MINORS (last updated 1996) (discussing a physician's ethical duty "to
promote the autonomy of minor patients by involving them in the decision-making process to a degree
commensurate with their abilities").
14. Comm. on Bioethics, supra note I1, at 316.
15. Yorma Unguru et al., Rethinking PediatricAssent: From Requirement to Ideal, 55 PEDIATRIC
CLINICS N. AM. 211, 212 (2008).
16. Id. at 216.
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jurisdictions, the law's representation of the differences that justify these distinct
regimes must be conceptually stable-or the law risks truly fatal inconsistency.
So what differences justify separate regimes for adolescents and adults? This
is the core question, because the ways in which adolescents and adults vary must
inform the ways in which our laws and ethical norms treat them differently. And
this is the question on which neuroscience can shed at least some light.
Neuroscience can inform legal regimes relating to adolescent decision
making, although it cannot fully explain them, by substantiating and verifying, or
negating, the ideas of difference on which such policies currently rest. Findings
based in neuroscience can inform decision-makers about potential fallacies or
anachronisms built into policies' construction of adolescent needs and capacities,
which support reform. Or, these findings can help verify the bases on which a
particular regime is constructed. On the other hand, neuroscience may not be
affirmatively relevant to every area of adolescent decision making, but it at least
plays a negative role as to each: Certainly, legal and ethical regimes established
specifically to account for differences between adolescents and adults should not
embody presumptions or achieve outcomes that are contrary to the actual nature of
the differences between these groups. This is neither because science trumps policy
nor even because any particular scientific fact mandates particular policy treatment;
rather, it is because when law or ethical norms are premised on, and justified by, a
set of facts-about-the-world, like the differences between adolescents and adults, it
must adhere to its own foundations or risk becoming absurd.
To orient readers, the next section will briefly introduce key differences
between adolescent and adult brain structures and functions.
II. BIOLOGICAL AND EXPERIENTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ADOLESCENT AND
ADULT BRAINS

Neuroimaging provides powerful evidence of how the typical brain develops
during adolescence. Functional imaging studies comparing the brains of adults and
adolescents are identifying the biological underpinnings of average behavioral
similarities and differences between these groups, giving new substance to
conventional distinctions between these life stages. Researchers' key findings relate
to the balance in adult and teen brains of executive function, emotion, and
responsiveness to social cues.' 7 The main findings as to each of these brain
functions will be addressed in turn.

17. Among the wealth of literature in this field, see, for example, B.J. Casey & Rebecca M. Jones,
Neurobiology of the Adolescent Brain and Behavior, 49 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY I 189 (2010); Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Early
Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861 (1999).

2012]

INTRODUCTION

7

A. Adolescents Have Less Developed "Executive Function" and ProcessSocial
Cues Diferently than Adults
Imaging studies show that adolescents have developing, but incomplete,
prefrontal cortices, which may indicate immature executive function.18 The
prefrontal cortex ("pfc") is the large, crennelated surface layer of the brain's frontal
lobes and is also the last region of the brain to develop fully. 19 Although
researchers have associated the pfe with hundreds of functions, 20 they generally
agree that the pfc is the seat of "executive control." 2 1 These are inhibitory
functions, like impulse control, long-term planning, and cost-benefit analysis. The
pfc may be characterized as the seat of "free won 't"-of our ability to put the
brakes on.22 Neuroscientists hypothesize that a less-developed pfc may correlate
with a lesser ability to control impulsivity, weigh future consequences, and engage
in rational, cost-benefit analysis-hallmarks of typical behavioral differences
between teens and adults. 2 3
Research suggests not only that adolescents reason less effectively than adults
but that they reason differently: Teens appear to evaluate risks relationally ("What
do my friends think about this?" "What will my friends think of me if I do/don't do
this?") rather than independently ("Is this a good idea?"). 24 One way to view this
peer-orientation is that teen cognition is the original crowd-sourcing; this is not

18. For a synopsis of how brain images are made and interpreted, see, for example, Laurence R.
Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: Limitations in the Legal Use of Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 272-76 (2007) (describing the mechanics of
EEG, PET, and fMRI image production and interpretation). For a discussion of the "limitations and
distortions" of fMRI, see id. at 278-80 (noting that, among other difficulties, brain images can "vary
significantly both between subjects and across sessions [with the same subject]").
19. See Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood
Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ScI. 8174, 8174 (2004) (showing that pfc is the last
brain region of complete maturation); Tomas Paus et al., Structural Maturationof Neural Pathways in
Children and Adolescents: In Vivo Study, 283 SCIENCE 1908, 1908 (1999); Giedd et al., supra note 17,
at 861-62.
20. J. Grafman et al., Fables of the Prefrontal Cortex, 18 BEHAV. & BRAIN SC. 349 (1995)
(identifying, in a seven-page list, the hundreds of human abilities and characteristics that various
researchers have localized to the prefrontal cortex).
21. MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN: THE SCIENCE OF OUR MORAL DILEMMAS 9596 (2006).
22. Id. Gazzaniga describes "free won't" as the ability to suppress inappropriate thoughts, speech,
or action. While the pfc may enact "free won't," pfc maturation alone cannot account for how the brain
determines what is or is not appropriate under the circumstances and, therefore, when to apply the
brakes.
23. See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 30-57

(2008) (reviewing the state of the research on adolescent brain development). For a thoughtful
discussion of Scott and Steinberg's work, see Emily Buss, Review, Rethinking the Connection Between
Developmental Science and Juvenile Justice, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 493 (2009).
24. SCorf & STEINBERG, supra note 23, at 38, 45, 48-50 (describing adolescents' peer orientation
and research on the neurological and psychological bases of teens' peer orientation).
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necessarily the wrong way to make decisions but it might have different costs and
advantages than the decision-making styles more typical of adults.2 5
Professor Abigail Baird's research shows the power of social cognition in
adolescents. 26 She and her research team asked subjects during interviews and
during brain scanning sessions to evaluate dangerous activities, like whether it
would be a good idea to set their hair on fire or to free-swim with Great White
sharks. Adults had immediate, negative autonomic responses-as well as quick
verbal replies. Adolescents, though, tended to read the social barometer before
answering one way or another, checking what a peer thought before answering the
question. When they evaluated the high-risk scenarios in the scanner, they failed to
show the immediate, physiological fear signals that cue adults to avoid bad risks.
The teens did, however, show automatic fear activation when they contemplated
social rejection. In other words, Baird's research suggests that typical teens respond
on a pre-conscious, neurological level to the threat of social rejection the way
adults respond to threats of immolation and death. 27
These neurological findings may help explain why exhortations to teens not to
succumb to peer pressure are of limited, if any, value. Expecting to change a typical
teen's behavior by telling him to stand firm in the face of peer ridicule might be
akin to telling a typical adult to stay put in the face of a shark attack; not utterly
useless, but close. Based on these and other findings, we might expect-and data
confirms-that teens are most likely to act impulsively, break the law, and make
bad choices in situations where peer salience is high. 28 When teens are on their
own, however, or are structurally insulated from peer-related considerations, their
cognition and decision making is equivalent or even superior to that of adults. This
kind of finding could be useful in evaluating and constructing legal regimes related
to adolescent decision making.
This relational nature of adolescent decision making is not merely (or not
necessarily) a flaw resulting from underdevelopment. Instead, the acute social
sensitivity of adolescents itself plays a crucial developmental role. In their article in
this issue, clinical psychologist Abigail A. Baird and her co-authors Christy L.
Barrow and Molly K. Richard describe adolescence as being analogous to the

25. Gregory S. Berns et al., Neural Mechanisms of the Influence of Popularity on Adolescent
Ratings of Music, 49 NEUROIMAGE 2687, 2687 (2010) (correlating neurological and behavioral markers

of anxiety about unpopularity with teen subjects' preferences for pop songs; researchers variation of
information about songs' popularity altered teens' perceptions of the songs; neural and behavioral
assessments showed teens' anxiety if a song they liked later was rated as unpopular). See also Abigail
Baird, In Teen Music Choices, Anxiety Rules: Teens' Brains Reveal Discomfort When Taste Fails to
Conform, SCI. AM. ONLINE (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=in-teenmusic-choices-fear-rules.
26. See Abigail Baird et al., Juvenile NeuroLaw: When It's Good It Is Very Good Indeed, and When
It's Bad It's Horrid,15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 15 (2012).
27. Id.
28. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

INTRODUCTION

2012]

9

"critical period" of early childhood in which infants must acquire human
grammar. 29 In the "sensitive period" of adolescence, they contend, teens learn the
social language of adult interaction. 30 Just as babies babble and stutter acquiring
primary language, adolescents' sometimes inept and incomplete social "utterances"
should be understood as practice with social "language." On this view, the
behavioral "babbling" of adolescence-as awkward, painful, and sometimes
harmful as it is-is the essential practice adolescents require to develop into agents
who can participate fluently in their particular social world.
B. Teens Must Connect Emotion and Reason Through Experience
Executive function and emotional responses are not just less developed or
different in teens: These two capacities are also less closely linked than in the
typical adult brain.3' As a result, a teen may intellectually understand an issue and
emotionally have a response to that issue, but those two processes may occur nearly
in parallel rather than in dialogue. 32 This implicates decision making, because
decisions are not simply, or even primarily, rational: Emotional and executive
functions must work together to bring about almost any kind of decision.33
For the pfc to receive and then inhibit impulses arising from the brain's limbic
regions, these brain regions must be connected to each other via nerve fibers. In
adults with normal impulse control, long, thick "tracts" of nerve fibers connect the
prefrontal cortex with key limbic areas. 34 Research correlates the density and extent
(literally the length) of the fibers tracts with impulse; several experiments have
succeeded in using the strength of these connections in predicting self-control in
29. Baird et al., supra note 26.
30. Id.
31. B.J. Casey et al., Braking and Accelerating of the Adolescent Brain, 21 J. RES. ON
ADOLESCENCE 21, 25 (2011).

32. Id.
33. See Antoine Bechara et al., Different Contributions of the Human Amygdala and Ventromedial
Prefrontal Cortex to Decision-Making, 19 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5473 (1999) (a classic paper setting out
early proof of the "somatic marker hypothesis," which "proposes that decision-making is a process that
depends on emotiona"). The somatic marker hypothesis has since become widely adopted. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral
Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001) (arguing that judgments, particularly moral judgments,
are "generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations," while rational faculties create post hoc
justifications for fundamentally emotionally-driven responses). Despite the reputation emotion has had
over the years as a sort of flaw that undermines reason, studies of brain-damaged patients show that
decision making based on reason alone results in severely impaired decision making. Patients with
damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortext (vmPFC) suffer from pervasive lack of emotion - a kind
of "acquired psychopathy," which leaves them rationally intact but emotionally flat; these and other
brain-damaged patients have extreme difficulty making putatively "rational" decisions in the absence of
any inner emotional cues. Hannah Damasio, Disorders of Social Conduct Following Damage to
PrefrontalCortices, in NEUROBIOLOGY OF HUMAN VALUES 37, 37-46 (Jean-Pierre Changeux et al. eds.,
2005) (surveying acquired impairments in conduct, judgment and decision making).
34. Casey et al., supra note 31, at 25 (reviewing recent imaging and impulse control research on
white matter tracts connecting the pfc and subcortical regions).
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laboratory tasks.35 Adults have these neural connections because they developed
them during adolescence; adolescents, who may have highly developed verbal and
intellectual capacities, are still in the process of developing these inhibitory and
evaluative connections between intellect and drive or emotion. 36 If people were
cars, it would be as if we came out of the factory with all the acceleration-all the
drive, or drives-we will ever have but with our brake cables only weakly
connected. For the brake cables to connect more strongly over time, the precarious
car must take to the road and practice braking.37
The brain develops its executive control, inhibitory strength, and synthesis of
emotion and reason through the marriage of time and practice. This is because
mature decision making arises from ontogeny and experience. Adolescents thus
need not only time but also the right kinds of experiences, which might include
patterning and modeling on good mentors, taking risks and making mistakes,
engaging in meaningful reflection on one's own experiences and those of others,
and participating in formal and informal education that cultivates moral and
humane virtues.
The articles in this Issue explore ways in which various legal and ethical rules
can, and in some cases already do, balance the interests of protecting adolescentsand others-from their potentially poor decisions while allowing them enough
autonomy to gain the life experiences they need to become competent adults.
Having provided overviews of the legal and ethical regimes relating to adolescent
decision making, and the key features that distinguish the brain structures and
functions of adolescents from those of adults, this Introduction briefly describes the
articles that follow in this Issue.
III. CONTRIBUTORS

The first set of articles traces the evolution of legal trends in adolescent
decision making and incorporates discussions of neuroscience, medical treatment,
and substance misuse and mental illness. Setting the stage for this Issue's
consideration of adolescent decision making in light of current neuroscience,
clinical psychologist Abigail A. Baird and research assistants Christy L. Barrow
and Molly K. Richard describe their original research on adolescent brain
development and decision making in their article Juvenile NeuroLaw: When It's
Good It Is Very Good Indeed, and When It's Bad It's Horrid.3 8 The authors

35. Id. (noting that "frontostriatal connection strength positively predicted impulse control capacity,
as measured by performance on a go/nogo task").
36. Id.
37. See B.J. Casey et al, Imaging the Developing Brain: What Have We Learned About Cognitive
Development?, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE Scl. 104, 108 (2005) (arguing that research on the differences
between adolescent and adult brains must attend more carefully to the joint role in brain development of
biological maturation and experiential learning).
38. Baird et al., supra note 26.
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consider how this research relates to legal regimes ranging from the recent abolition
of the juvenile death penalty to forthcoming challenges to juveniles' access to
abortion. Baird and her colleagues present us with a dynamic systems view of
adolescent decision making: They show how the brain's particular stage of
development, the adolescent's immediate context, and the adolescent's experience
and conditioning in the broader social environment function as an integrated
system; no one factor controls, or even operates in the absence of the others. This,
they suggest, can help the law pinpoint the ways in which elements of this system
can be manipulated to improve outcomes. For example, they contrast teens' usually
impulsive, peer-influenced decisions to engage in criminal conduct with the
reflective, more peer-insulated reasoning a teen would engage in when deciding to
end life-extending treatment or terminate a pregnancy. By explaining the context of
the decision, which the law often fails to adequately address, Baird and her
colleagues resolve the seeming conflict between the criminal law, which tends to
treat juveniles as juveniles, and abortion jurisprudence, which in some states
permits adolescent girls to exercise the same autonomy to choose abortion as their
adult counterparts.
Professor Jessie Hill, in her article Medical Decision Making by and on
Behalf of Adolescents: Reconsidering First Principles, delves into the welter of
conflicting laws and norms about adolescent medical decision making. 39 She argues
that confusion in this arena results in part from scholars' and lawmakers' erroneous
beliefs about the foundations of these laws. Hill traces how lawmakers believe that
two putatively common law presumptions, one about childhood incapacity and the
other about parental rights, provide the foundation for the law of adolescent
medical decision making. She first challenges the descriptive accuracy of these
presumptions, finding a much richer and more varied historical record relating to
adolescents' legal control of their bodies. She then challenges the practical and
normative value of these presumptions. Finding that these presumed default rules
have neither the weight of common law tradition nor redeeming practical and
normative value, Hill proposes that laws relating to adolescent medical decision
making instead be grounded in constitutional doctrine on bodily integrity.
Developing constitutionally-grounded doctrine on minors' rights to bodily
integrity, and the conditions under which those rights may be curtailed or abrogated
by the state, would, she concludes, benefit medical providers, minors, and the state
of the law itself.
Adolescent Decision Making: Legal Issues With Respect to Treatment for
Substance Misuse and Mental Illness, by Professor Richard C. Boldt, describes the
need for balancing the interests of adolescents with those of their parents or
guardians when faced with decisions regarding medical treatment, focusing
specifically on treatment for substance misuse and other mental illnesses in the

39. Hill, supra note 6.
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context of informed consent and medical privacy concerns. 40 Boldt begins by
noting that three interests are at stake when addressing adolescent's ability to make
decisions about their medical treatment: basic interests in physical and emotional
well-being; developmental interests in maximizing capacities; and autonomy
interests in having the liberty to make decisions. In demonstrating how these
interests can conflict with parents' interests and attempts to act in good faith, Boldt
argues that adolescents' involvement in medical decision making should be
handled along a continuum to balance the competing interests. He then provides an
overview of the different ways that states have sought to achieve this balance
through legislative enactments and judicial decisions, concluding that while
parents' decisions tend to be the "final say," many states have introduced
exceptions for consent to substance misuse treatment. Boldt initiates a discussion
on the disclosure of confidential medical treatment information to adolescents'
parents. He notes that in this arena, federal and state laws come into conflict
because federal privacy laws require written consent before disclosure of
confidential medical information. According to Boldt, this is another example of
the conflict between adolescents' autonomy interests and parents' interests in their
children's care. Boldt concludes that adolescents should be as closely involved as
reasonably possible in every major step of their treatment and its possible
consequences, as well as the consequences of rejecting treatment, even if they are
not the final decision makers.
The second set of articles transitions to a focus on the ethical issues involved
in adolescent medical decision making. Like Professor Boldt, Dr. Yoram Unguru, a
pediatric oncologist, stresses the importance of including youth and adolescents in
key decisions about their medical treatment in age-appropriate ways. 4 ' In Decision
Making for Children with Life-limiting Illnesses: A Clinical Approach, he argues
that it is both important and beneficial to have candid discussions with children
regarding prognosis and death. Unguru's article approaches adolescent medical
decision making from a clinical and ethical perspective and focuses on the need for
direct communication among children, parents, and physicians in general, but more
particularly when faced with life-limiting illnesses. Unguru begins with a
discussion of children's decision-making capacities, noting that it is not only
appropriate, but also ethically justifiable for pediatricians to obtain the assent of
children who are unable to make autonomous choices. According to Unguru, in
determining the validity of a minor's assent, medical professionals must account
for the child's developmental stage and her basic treatment preferences, even if
those preferences are sometimes overridden by parental choices. In defining the
limits of assent, Unguru acknowledges that parental decisions hold greater weight
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in most contexts; yet, he argues that parents and medical professionals need to
actively engage children and allow them to contribute to their treatment plans. He
stresses that evaluating children's decision-making capacity is an individuallyfocused endeavor that should consider the child's maturity and past experience with
decision making. In emphasizing the need for direct communication with children,
Unguru points out that pediatricians often "bridge the gap" between children and
parents, opening up lines of communication for the involved parties to express their
preferences. He concludes that the concepts of assent and parental permission are
not mutually exclusive, but rather combine to create a more effective decisionmaking model that pediatricians and allied health care professionals are in a unique
position to foster and assess.
The article by Professor Alicia Ouellette, Body Modification and Adolescent
Decision Making: Proceed with Caution, then introduces issues relating to
adolescents' access to elective medical procedures, or body modification, such as
cosmetic surgery, body piercings, and tattoos. 42 She acknowledges that cosmetic
body modification is a prominent part of youth culture in the United States, and as
such, merits more attention from the legal community. Ouellette notes that most
states permit cosmetic medical procedures with parental consent, while some
prohibit body modification in the form of tattoos or body piercings to any
individual under age eighteen, regardless of parental consent. She posits that the
varied roles of adolescents in our society, as rights-bearing teenagers, as vulnerable
children, and as parts of autonomous family units explain the complexity of these
laws. Ouellete supports increased decision-making rights for adolescents in the
health care context, but argues that cosmetic body modification procedures require
greater control of adolescents' decisions because the cognitive deficiencies in
adolescents-impulsiveness, susceptibility to peer pressure, and risk-taking
behavior-are more prevalent in decisions about body modification than in
decisions about medical treatment. Ouellette suggests that adolescents ought to be
legally permitted to engage in cosmetic body modification either when they make
an informed choice and have parental consent or when they make an informed
choice without parental consent and with the support of medical professionals who
agree the procedure is immediately necessary to prevent psychological or other
harms. She concludes by arguing that parental consent laws are an important
protective mechanism, but that they should be limited such that adolescents are not
forced into a procedure they do not want and are similarly not prohibited from
having a procedure that a medical professional thinks is advisable.
In the final article, A Choice to Which Adolescents Should not be Exposed:
Cosmetic Surgery as Satire, Dr. Dan O'Connor challenges the concept of "choice"
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itself in a trenchant critique of adolescent cosmetic surgery. 43 Rather than focusing
on adolescents' capacity for making decisions about cosmetic surgery, O'Connor
discusses whether adolescents should have the opportunity to make such decisions.
Unlike Ouellette, he thinks that cosmetic surgery on adolescents is "ethically
illegitimate." In presenting cosmetic surgery as a "satire upon medicine," he argues
that cosmetic surgery is an option to which adolescents should not even be
exposed. O'Connor presents two ethical issues that, in his view, support keeping
cosmetic surgery options away from adolescents-"unjust appearance standards"
and the "healing imperative of medicine." He points out that not all exercises in
apparent decision making represent true choices. Cosmetic surgery presents
adolescents with what he argues is an illusory choice: the false dichotomy that a
teen can choose to remain deficient and defective or transform into a socially
acceptable member of her sex. O'Connor contends that for adults to condone
adolescent cosmetic surgery is for them to subtly "endorse the message that the
bullies are right about their bodies." Using cosmetic surgery as the remedy for
social or self-inflicted criticism of a teen's body is tantamount to "vaccinat[ing]"
her against the epidemic myth of female physical perfection, while also "mak[ing
her] into a carrier of it." Instead, O'Connor concludes, adolescents should be
protected from cosmetic procedures and perhaps even from information that such
procedures are available to them.
The laws relating to adolescent medical decision making are as varied within
jurisdictions as they are across those jurisdictions, and the ethical doctrines in this
area are in flux. Although there are not distinct fields of "adolescent medical
decision-making law or ethics," examining policies in this context provides insight
as to how legal and ethical doctrines incorporate and respond to developments in
research on human behavior, cognition, and development. We thank the authors in
this Issue for their valuable contributions to this conversation, and we hope that
these articles initiate a more extensive dialogue about how advances in
neuroscience research can inform and shape different policy approaches to
adolescent medical decision making.

43. Dan O'Connor, A Choice to Which Adolescents Should not be Exposed: Cosmetic Surgery as
Satire, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 153 (2012).

